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Abstract: This paper investigates the sensitivity of average wage gap decompositions to met-
hods resting on diﬀerent assumptions regarding endogeneity of observed characteristics, sample
selection into employment, and estimators' functional form. Applying ﬁve distinct decomposition
techniques to estimate the gender wage gap in the U.S. using data from the National Longitudinal
Survey of Youth 1979, we ﬁnd that the magnitudes of the wage gap components are generally
not stable across methods. Furthermore, the deﬁnition of the observed characteristics matters:
merely including their levels (as frequently seen in wage decompositions) entails smaller explai-
ned and larger unexplained components than when including both their levels and histories in the
analysis. Given the sensitivity of our results, we advise caution when using wage decompositions
for policy recommendations.
Keywords: wage decomposition, gender wage gap, causal mechanisms, mediation.
JEL classiﬁcation: C14, C21, J31, J71.
We have beneﬁted from comments by conference participants in Landeck-Zams (Ski and Labor Seminar 2017) and
Bern (Conference on Discrimination in the Labor Market 2017), as well as by seminar participants in Zurich (ETH), Oslo
(Frisch Centre), and Ispra (European Commission Competence Centre on Microeconomic Evaluation). Addresses for
correspondence: Martin Huber, Anna Solovyeva, University of Fribourg, Bd. de Perolles 90, 1700 Fribourg, Switzerland;
martin.huber@unifr.ch, anna.solovyeva@unifr.ch.
1 Introduction
A vast empirical literature is concerned with the analysis and decomposition of gender wage gaps. Blinder
(1973) and Oaxaca (1973) (see also Duncan (1967)) suggested a linear method allowing disentangling
the total gap into an explained part that is linked to diﬀerences in observed characteristics, for instance
education, and an unexplained part that is linked to unobserved factors, for instance discrimination.
Several studies proposed non-parametric decomposition methods dropping the linearity assumptions, see
for instance DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux (1996), Barsky, Bound, Charles, and Lupton (2002), Frolich
(2007), Mora (2008), and Nopo (2008). Finally, another branch of the literature suggested decomposition
methods at quantiles (rather than means) of the wage distribution, see for instance Juhn, Murphy, and
Pierce (1993), DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux (1996), Machado and Mata (2005), Melly (2005), Firpo,
Fortin, and Lemieux (2007), Chernozhukov, Fernandez-Val, and Melly (2009), and Firpo, Fortin, and
Lemieux (2009).
The aforementioned methods ignore the potential endogeneity of the observed characteristics, which
are typically `bad controls' in the sense of Angrist and Pischke (2009) as they are determined later in life,
i.e. after gender. This implies that the explained and unexplained parts do not correspond to the true
causal mechanisms related to observed and unobserved factors, respectively, through which gender inﬂu-
ences wage. For this reason, policy conclusions  for instance about the magnitude of discrimination  are
diﬃcult to derive from such conventional decompositions, see Kunze (2008), Huber (2015), and Yamaguchi
(2014) for related criticisms. Using an approach that comes from the literature on nonparametric causal
mediation analysis (see for instance Robins and Greenland (1992) and Pearl (2001)), Huber (2015) con-
trols for observed confounders at birth as one possible approach to improve upon the endogeneity issue.
However, a further threat to identiﬁcation is sample selection (see Heckman (1976) and Heckman (1979))
due to the fact that wages are only observed for those who work. For this reason, Neuman and Oaxaca
(2003) and Neuman and Oaxaca (2004) combine classic decompositions with Heckman-type sample se-
lection correction.1 Alternatively, Maasoumi and Wang (2016) apply the copula approach of Arellano and
Bonhomme (2010) to model the joint distribution of the quantile of the wage distribution and selection. In
the presence of panel data, Blau and Kahn (2006) and Olivetti and Petrongolo (2008)2 consider proxying
1See also the method of Machado (2017), which permits arbitrary unobserved heterogeneity in the selection
process.
2Olivetti and Petrongolo (2008) also estimate the Manski bounds (Manski (1989)) on the distribution of wages,
using the actual and the imputed wage distributions. Bicakova (2014) derives bounds on gender unemployment
gaps.
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non-observed wages by the observed wage in the closest period.3 Finally, few studies aim at controlling
for both endogeneity and sample selection. Garcia, Hernandez, and Lopez-Nicolas (2001) combine instru-
mental variable regression to control for the endogeneity of one of the observed characteristics (education)
with Heckman-type sample selection correction in a parametric framework. The more ﬂexible causal me-
diation method by Huber and Solovyeva (2018) aims at tackling endogeneity by conditioning on observed
potential confounders and sample selection by controlling for the selection probability based on observa-
bles and/or instruments.
In this paper, we investigate the sensitivity of average wage gap decompositions to various methods
ignoring and considering endogeneity and sample selection, to provide insights on the robustness of de-
compositions across identifying assumptions. To this end, we consider U.S. wage data collected in the
year 2000 coming from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 (NLSY). The latter is a panel
study of young individuals in the U.S. aged 14 to 22 years in 1979. The analysed estimators include the
Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition; semiparametric inverse probability weighting (IPW, see Hirano, Imbens,
and Ridder (2003)), which eases linearity but ignores endogeneity and sample selection just as the Oaxaca-
Blinder decomposition; IPW controlling for potential confounders at birth to mitigate endogeneity as in
Huber (2015) but ignoring sample selection; and the approaches proposed in Huber and Solovyeva (2018)
to tackle both endogeneity and sample selection.
We ﬁnd that the explained and unexplained wage gap components are generally not stable across
methods. Even the total gap estimates diﬀer non-negligibly between methods ignoring and controlling
for sample selection. Although we do not claim that any of the estimators is capable of fully tackling
identiﬁcation concerns, our results cast doubts about the usefulness of standard decompositions used in
the vast majority of empirical studies, which ignore endogeneity and sample selection altogether. We also
investigate the robustness of our ﬁndings w.r.t. the deﬁnition of the observed characteristics. In our main
speciﬁcation, we include both levels as well as histories of such characteristics (e.g., current occupation as
well as years in current occupation). In a robustness check, we only keep the levels and omit histories (as it
appears to be the convention in many decompositions) and ﬁnd this to reduce the explained and increase
the unexplained component across our estimators. In light of the sensitivity of some of our results w.r.t.
methods and variable deﬁnitions, we advise caution when basing policy recommendations (which typically
require a proper identiﬁcation of the causal mechanisms underlying the wage gap) on the outcomes of wage
3As an alternative use of panel data, Lemieux (1998) combines ﬁxed eﬀect estimation with decomposition
methods and allows for heterogeneity of the return to ﬁxed eﬀects across groups. However, this strategy depends
on individuals switching groups, which is rarely the case for gender.
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decompositions. This seems important given that the empirical literature on wage decompositions appears
to have paid comparably little attention to identiﬁcation issues that may jeopardize the interpretability of
the parameters of interest.
Goraus, Tyrowicz, and van der Velde (2015) provide a further study systematically investigating the
robustness of wage gap decompositions across speciﬁcations, considering the Polish Labor Force Survey.
The authors compare estimates of the unexplained component across parametric and nonparametric met-
hods for both means and quantiles. They also analyze issues of common support (or overlap) in observed
characteristics across females and males and selection into employment based on Heckman-type sample
selection corrections. Their results suggest that enforcing versus not enforcing common support in the
characteristics has a non-negligible impact on the estimates. Also our IPW procedures enforce common
support by speciﬁc trimming rules to ensure the comparability of observations across gender and employ-
ment states in terms of observables. The sample selection corrections, on the other hand, barely aﬀect esti-
mates of the unexplained component in Goraus, Tyrowicz, and van der Velde (2015). We also ﬁnd that our
weighting-based sample selection corrections change the unexplained component moderately when com-
pared to IPW controlling for potential confounders alone, while more variation is observed for the total
wage gap and the explained component. We point out that one major distinction of our study and Goraus,
Tyrowicz, and van der Velde (2015) is that they do not consider methods that control for confounders at
birth to tackle the endogeneity of the observed characteristics.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 formally discusses the econometric
parameters of interest and the identifying assumptions required for the various methods considered to
consistently decompose wage gaps into observed and unobserved causal mechanisms. Section 3 discusses the
NLSY data, sample deﬁnition, and descriptive statistics. Section 4 presents and interprets the estimation
results. Section 5 concludes.
2 Identiﬁcation
Fortin, Lemieux, and Firpo (2011) pointed out that while it is standard in econometrics to ﬁrst discuss
identiﬁcation and then introduce appropriate estimators, most studies in the ﬁeld of wage gap decompo-
sitions go directly to estimation without clarifying identiﬁcation ﬁrst. Here, we ﬁrst deﬁne what in our
opinion should be the parameters of interest to be able to derive useful policy recommendations. To this
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end, let G denote a binary group dummy for gender, Y the outcome of interest (e.g., log wage) and X the
vector of observed characteristics (e.g., education, work experience, occupation, industry, and others). We
assume that G causally precedes X, which appears intuitive as gender is determined even prior to birth,
while X is determined by decisions later in life. G might inﬂuence Y `indirectly' via its eﬀect on X, i.e. by
a causal mechanism related to observed characteristics. For instance, gender may have an eﬀect on wage
because females and males select themselves into diﬀerent occupations. G might aﬀect Y also `directly',
i.e. through factors not observed by the researcher such that they do not appear in X. For instance, gender
could have an impact on the perception of individual traits by decision makers in the labor market (see
Greiner and Rubin (2011)), which in turn may entail discriminatory behavior. A graphical representation
of this causal framework is given in Figure 1, where arrows represent causal eﬀects: G inﬂuences Y either
through X or `directly'.




For a formal deﬁnition of the causal mechanisms running through observed characteristics X and
unobserved factors as parameters of interest, we denote by Y (g) and X(g) the potential outcomes and
characteristics when exogenously setting gender G to a speciﬁc g, with g ∈ {1, 0}.4 E(X(1)) − E(X(0))
gives the average causal eﬀect of G on X (represented by the arrow of G to X in Figure 1), so to
speak the `ﬁrst stage' of the indirect eﬀect. E(Y (1)) − E(Y (0)), on the other hand, gives the total
average causal eﬀect of G on Y , represented by the sum of direct and indirect (i.e. operating through X)
eﬀects. Following the causal mediation literature, see Robins and Greenland (1992) and Pearl (2001), we
further reﬁne the potential outcome notation to be able to distinguish between the causal mechanisms in
Figure 1: Let Y (g) = Y (g,X(g)), to make explicit that the potential outcome is aﬀected by the group
variable both directly and indirectly via X(g). This permits rewriting the total eﬀect of G on Y as
E(Y (1)) − E(Y (0)) = E[Y (1, X(1))] − E[Y (0, X(0))] and more importantly, it allows disentangling the
latter into the causal mechanisms of interest. That is, the diﬀerence in potential outcomes due to a switch
4See for instance Rubin (1974) for an introduction to the potential outcome framework.
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from X(1) to X(0) while keeping gender ﬁxed at G = 1 yields the indirect eﬀect (denoted by ψ), while
varying gender and ﬁxing characteristics at X(0) gives the direct eﬀect (η). Both together add up to the
total causal eﬀect:
E[Y (1, X(1))]− E[Y (0, X(0))] = E[Y (1, X(1))]− E[Y (1, X(0))]︸ ︷︷ ︸
ψ
+E[Y (1, X(0))]− E[Y (0, X(0))]︸ ︷︷ ︸
η
. (1)
We now introduce the ﬁrst identifying assumption considered in our empirical analysis, which rules
out endogeneities of G,X and sample selection issues.
Assumption 1 (sequential independence):
(a) {Y (g′, x), X(g)}⊥G for all g′, g ∈ {0, 1} and x in the support of X,
(b) Y (g′, x)⊥X|G = g for all g′, g ∈ {0, 1} and x in the support of X,
(c) Y (g,X) is linear X for g ∈ {0, 1},
(d) Pr(G = 1|X = x) > 0 for all x in the support of X,
where `⊥' denotes statistical independence. Under Assumption 1(a), G is as good as randomly assigned, i.e.
there are no factors confounding G on the one hand and Y and/or X on the other hand. Under Assumption
1(b), observed characteristics like education are as good as randomly assigned within gender, i.e. given G,
so that there are no factors confounding X and Y . Assumption 1(c) imposes potential outcomes to be
linear in X. Finally, Assumption 1(d) is a common support restriction. It implies that the conditional
probability (the so-called propensity score) to belong to the reference group (G = 1), e.g., males, is larger
than zero for any value in the support of X, such that for each female observation (G = 0), there exists a
male who is comparable w.r.t. X.
The Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition consistently estimates ψ and η under Assumptions 1(a)-1(c). To
see this, note that under Assumption 1(a), E(X(g)) = E(X|G = g). Under Assumptions 1(a), 1(b), and
1(c), E[Y (g, x)] = E(Y |G = g,X = x) = cg + xβg, where cg denotes a gender-speciﬁc constant and βg
denotes a vector of gender-speciﬁc coeﬃcients on X in the respective female or male population. Finally,
by iterated expectations, E[Y (g,X(g′))] = cg + E(X|G = g′)βg for g, g′ ∈ {0, 1}. Therefore,
ψ = E[Y (1, X(1))]− E[Y (1, X(0))] = [E(X|G = 1)− E(X|G = 0)]β1, (2)
η = E[Y (1, X(0))]− E[Y (0, X(0))] = c1 − c0 + E(X|G = 0)(β1 − β0). (3)
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The left hand expressions in (2) and (3) correspond to the probability limits of the explained and unexplai-
ned components, respectively, in the Oaxaca-Blinder decompositions. For (2) and (3) to hold, Assumpti-
ons 1(a) and 1(b) could be relaxed to mean independence, while full independence needs to be maintained
for decompositions of quantiles.5
Nonparametric approaches do not rely on the linearity assumption 1(c), but instead require common
support as postulated in Assumption 1(d). This becomes obvious from considering the denominators of
the following expressions based on inverse probability weighting (IPW) by the propensity score, which









Pr(G = 1|X) ·
1− Pr(G = 1|X)






Pr(G = 1|X) ·
1− Pr(G = 1|X)





1− Pr(G = 1)
]
. (5)
(5) is identical to the identiﬁcation result for the average treatment eﬀect on the non-treated (see Hirano,
Imbens, and Ridder (2003) for IPW-based treatment evaluation in subgroups based on reweighing),
even though the causal framework diﬀers. In classic treatment evaluation, one typically controls for
pre-treatment (or pre-group) variables to tackle the endogeneity of the treatment (or group). Here, X
are post-group variables such that conditioning allows separating the indirect causal mechanism via X
from the direct one related to unobservables. Obviously, this is only feasible if neither G nor X given G
are endogenous as postulated in Assumption 1. In the empirical application presented in Section 4, we
consider both the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition and estimation based on the sample analogues of (4)
and (5).
In a next step, we ease Assumption 1 by assuming that the identifying restrictions need not hold
unconditionally, but conditional on a set of observed covariates measured at birth and denoted by W .
This allows for endogeneity of X, as long as it can be tackled by W . The dashed arrow going from W to G
in Figure 2 even points to the possibility of an endogenous G. This may appear unnecessary when assuming
gender to be randomly assigned by nature. However, speciﬁc interventions like selective abortions could
in principle jeopardize randomization, which is permitted in Assumption 2 below as long as W captures
all confounding.
5However, analogous results to (2) and (3) cannot be applied to quantile decompositions, because the law of
iterated expectations does not apply, see Fortin, Lemieux, and Firpo (2011).
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Assumption 2 (sequential conditional independence):
(a) {Y (g′, x), X(g)}⊥G|W for all g′, g ∈ {0, 1} and x in the support of X,
(b) Y (g′, x)⊥X|G = g,W = w for all g′, g ∈ {0, 1} and x,w in the support of X,W ,
(c) Pr(G = 1|X = x,W = w) > 0 and 0 < Pr(G = 1|W = w) < 1 for all x,w in the support of X,W .
Identical or similar conditions as Assumption 2 have been frequently applied in the literature on causal
mediation analysis, see for instance Pearl (2001), and Imai, Keele, and Yamamoto (2010). Assumptions
2(a) and (b) imply that after controlling for W , no unobserved variables confound either G and Y , G
and X, or X and Y given G. Assumption 2(c) is a reﬁned common support restriction, requiring that
the conditional probability of belonging to the reference group given X,W is larger than zero, while the
conditional probability given W must neither be zero nor one. The latter implies that for each female in
the population, the exists a comparable observation in terms of W among males and vice versa. Under










Pr(G = 1|X,W ) ·
1− Pr(G = 1|X,W )






Pr(G = 1|X,W ) ·
1− Pr(G = 1|X,W )





1− Pr(G = 1|W )
]
. (7)
Estimation of (ethnic) wage gaps based on (6) and (7) has been considered in Huber (2015) and is also
among the methods investigated in our empirical application presented further below.
The approaches discussed so far abstract from sample selection stemming from the issue that wages
are only observed for individuals in employment and that the decision to work is unlikely to be random.
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However, the previous sets of assumptions, even if satisﬁed in the total population, do not hold in the
working subpopulation if selection into employment is related to factors that also aﬀect the outcome, for
instance ability. To improve upon this problem both notationally and methodologically, we introduce a
binary selection indicator S which is equal to one if an individual is employed such that the wage outcome
Y is observed in the data and zero otherwise. We maintain that G,X,W are observed for all individuals
and note that each of these variables might aﬀect S which can be considered as yet another outcome
variable.
Using the results of Huber and Solovyeva (2018), one may combine Assumption 2 with speciﬁc re-
strictions on the nature of selection into employment. The ﬁrst approach of Huber and Solovyeva (2018)
assumes selection to be related to the observed variables G,X,W only.
Assumption 3 (Selection on observables):
(a) Y⊥S|G = g,X = x,W = w for all g ∈ {0, 1} and x,w in the support of X,W ,
(b) Pr(S = 1|G = g,X = x,W = w) > 0 for all g ∈ {0, 1} and x,w in the support of X,W .
By Assumption 3(a), there are no unobservables confounding S and Y conditional on G,X,W , so that
outcomes are missing at random (MAR) in the denomination of Rubin (1976). The common support re-
striction implies that conditional on the values of G,X,W in their joint support, the probability to be
observed is larger than zero, otherwise no outcome is observed for some speciﬁc combinations of these vari-
ables and identiﬁcation fails. Figure 3 presents a graphical illustration of the decomposition with selection
on observables.








Under Assumptions 2 and 3, the parameters of interest are identiﬁed by the following IPW expression,
which ﬁts the general framework of IPW-based M-estimation of missing data models in Wooldridge (2002):
ψ = E
[
Y ·G · S




Y ·G · S
Pr(G = 1|X,W ) · Pr(S = 1|G,X,W ) ·
1− Pr(G = 1|X,W )





Y ·G · S
Pr(G = 1|X,W ) · Pr(S = 1|G,X,W ) ·
1− Pr(G = 1|X,W )




Y · (1−G) · S
(1− Pr(G = 1|W )) · Pr(S = 1|G,X,W )
]
. (9)
Alternatively to Assumption 3, Huber and Solovyeva (2018) present a control function approach for
the case that selection is related to unobservables aﬀecting the outcome. This requires an instrument for
selection, denoted by Z, which aﬀects selection but is not directly associated with the outcome. Figure
4 provides a graphical representation of mediation with selection on unobservables and an instrument for
selection. E , V , and U denote unobserved variables that aﬀect the instrument for selection Z, the selection
indicator S, and the outcome Y , respectively.










Assumption 4 (Instrument for selection):
a) There exists an instrument Z that may be a function of G,X, i.e. Z = Z(G,X), is conditio-
nally correlated with S, i.e. E[Z · S|G,X,W ] 6= 0, and satisﬁes (i) Y (g, x, z) = Y (g, x) and (ii)
{Y (g, x), X(g′)}⊥Z(g′′, x′)|W = w for all g, g′, g′′ ∈ {0, 1} and z, x, x′, w in the support of Z,X,W ,
(b) S = I{V ≤ Π(G,X,W,Z)}, where Π is a general function and V is a scalar (index of) unobservable(s)
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with a strictly monotonic cumulative distribution function conditional on W ,
(c) V⊥(G,X,Z)|W ,
(d) E[Y (1, x) − Y (0, x)|W = w, V = v, S = 1] = E[Y (1, x) − Y (0, x)|W = w, V = v] and
E[Y (g,X(1)) − Y (g,X(0))|W = w, V = v, S = 1] = E[Y (g,M(1)) − Y (g,M(0))|W = w, V = v], for all
g ∈ {0, 1} and x,w, v in the support of X,W, V ,
(e) Pr(G = 1|X = x,W = w, p(Q) = p(q)) > 0, 0 < Pr(G = 1|W = w, p(Q) = p(q)) < 1, and p(q) > 0 for
all g ∈ {0, 1} and x,w, z in the support of X,W,Z.
In contrast to Assumption 3(a), the unobservable V in the selection equation is now allowed to be
associated with unobservables U aﬀecting the outcome. Therefore, the distribution of V generally diﬀers
across values of G,X conditional on W , which entails confounding. Identiﬁcation hinges on exogenous
shifts in the conditional selection probability p(Q) = Pr(S = 1|G,M,X,Z) based on instrument Z,
with Q = (G,X,W,Z) for the sake of brevity. By using p(Q) as additional control variable in the
decompositions, one controls for the distribution of V and thus, for the confounding associations of V
with (i) D and {Y (d,m),M(d′)} and (ii) M and Y (d,m) that occur conditional on S = 1.
Z and S have to satisfy particular conditions. Z must not aﬀect Y or be associated with unobservables
aﬀecting X or Y conditional on W , as invoked in Assumption 4(a). By the threshold crossing model in
Assumption 4(b), p(Q) identiﬁes the distribution function of V given W . Assumption 4(c) implies the
(nonparametric) identiﬁcation of the distribution of V , as the latter is independent of (G,X,Z) given W .
Assumption 4(d) imposes homogeneity of the observed and unobserved causal mechanisms across employed
and non-employed populations conditional on W,V . Without this restriction, wage decompositions can
merely be conducted for the employed but not the total population, as eﬀects might be heterogeneous
in unobservables, see also the discussion in Newey (2007). A suﬃcient condition for eﬀect homogeneity
in unobservables is separability of observed and unobserved components in the outcome variable, i.e.
Y = η(G,M,X) + ν(U), where η, ν are general functions and U is a scalar or vector of unobservables.
Finally, the ﬁrst part of Assumption 4(e) strengthens the previous common support assumption 2(c) to also
hold when including p(Q) as additional control variable. The second part requires the selection probability
p(Q) to be larger than zero for any combination of values in the support of G,X,W,Z to ensure that
outcomes are observed for all values occurring in the population. Under Assumptions 2 and 4, the causal
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mechanisms are identiﬁed by the following expressions:
ψ = E
[
Y ·G · S




Y ·G · S
Pr(G = 1|X,W, p(Q)) · p(Q) ·
1− Pr(G = 1|X,W, p(Q))





Y ·G · S
Pr(G = 1|X,W, p(Q)) · p(Q) ·
1− Pr(G = 1|X,W, p(Q))




Y · (1−G) · S




Our data come from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 (NLSY79), a panel survey of young
individuals who were aged 14 to 22 years at the ﬁrst wave in 1979.6 Conducted annually until 1994, it
then became biannual. The data contain a wealth of individual characteristics, including rich information
relevant for labor market decisions, such as education, occupation, work experience and more. We estimate
decompositions for wages reported in the year 2000 when respondents were 35  43 years old. After
excluding 1,351 observations from the total NLSY79 sample in 2000 due to various data issues,7 our
evaluation sample consists of 6,658 individuals (3,162 men and 3,496 women). Table 3 in Appendix A
provides descriptive statistics (mean values, mean diﬀerences, and respective p-values based on two-sample
t-tests) for the key variables in our analysis. The group variable G is equal to zero for female and one for
male respondents, such that male wages are regarded as reference wages, as it is frequently the case in the
decomposition literature.8 The outcome variable of interest (Y ) is the log average hourly wage in the past
calendar year reported in 2000. The selection indicator S is equal to one for individuals who indicated to
have worked at least 1,000 hours in the past calendar year. This is the case for 87% of males and 70% of
females.
6The NLSY79 data consist of three independent probability samples: a cross-sectional sample (6,111 subjects,
or 48%) representing the non-institutionalized civilian youth; a supplemental sample (42%) oversampling civilian
Hispanic, black, and economically disadvantaged nonblack/non-Hispanic young people; and a military sample (10%)
comprised of youth serving in the military as of September 30, 1978 (Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department
of Labor (2001)).
7Speciﬁcally, we excluded 502 persons who reported to have worked 1,000 hours or more in the past calendar
year, but whose average hourly wages in the past calendar year were either missing or equal to zero. We also
dropped 54 working individuals with average hourly wages of less than $1 in the past calendar year. Furthermore,
608 observations with missing values in mediators (see Table 3 for the full list of mediators) and 186 observations
with missing values in the instruments for selection  the number of young children and the employment status of
the respondent's mother back when the respondent was 14 years old  were excluded.
8We refer to Sloczynski (2013) for a discussion of reference group choice in the potential outcome framework.
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The set of post-group characteristics X, which potentially mediate the eﬀect of gender on wages,
consists of individual variables reported in or constructed with reference to 1998: marital status, years in
marriage, the region of residence and how many years an individual has been residing in that region, an
indicator for living in an urban area (SMSA) and the number of years living in an urban area, education
level, indicators for the year when ﬁrst worked, number of jobs ever had, tenure with the current employer
(in weeks), industry and the number of years working there, occupation and the number of years working
in that occupation, whether employed in 1998 and total years of employment. Further characteristics are
the form of employment (whether full-time), the share of full-time employment in employment years in
199498, total weeks of employment, the number of weeks unemployed and the number of weeks out of the
labor force, and whether health problems prevented work. Moreover, several higher-order (squared and
cubed) and interaction terms are included to make the propensity score speciﬁcation more ﬂexible. p-values
of the two-sample t-tests in Table 3 in Appendix A reveal that women in our sample diﬀer signiﬁcantly
(at the 5% level) from men in a range of variables. For instance, males have on average more labor market
experience, while females have a higher average level of education. Important diﬀerences also arise in other
factors related to labor market performance (e.g., industry, occupation, employment form, etc.).
Although X includes and even surpasses the set of variables conventionally used in wage decompo-
sitions, further potentially important characteristics mediating the eﬀect of gender on wage are not con-
sidered. For instance, risk preferences, attitudes towards competition and negotiations, and other socio-
psychological factors (see e.g., Bertrand (2011) and Azmat and Petrongolo (2014)), are not available in
our data. Their eﬀects thus contribute to the unexplained component.
Potential confoundersW related to factors determined at or prior to birth include race, religion, year of
birth, birth order, parental place of birth (in the U.S. or abroad), and parental education. We acknowledge
that further confounders not available in our data but correlated with G, X, and/or Y likely exist. For
instance, see Cobb-Clark (2016) for a review of biological factors, such as sensory functioning (e.g., time-
space perceptions), emotions, and levels of sex hormones, potentially linking gender with labor market
behavior and outcomes. In particular, some studies relate higher levels of prenatal testosterone to stronger
preference for risk (Garbarino, Slonim, and Sydnor (2011)) and sorting into traditionally male-dominated
occupations (Manning, Reimers, Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, and Fink (2010) and Nye and Orel (2015)).
Therefore, we do not claim that controlling for W fully tackles endogeneity bias. Nevertheless, we are
interested in the sensitivity of decompositions w.r.t. to the inclusion and exclusion of W , even if these
variables only comprise a subset of the actual confounders.
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Finally, we deﬁne the number of children in 1999 younger than 6 and 15 years old, respectively, as
instruments Z for selection into our employment indicator S. Such instruments based on the number
of children in a household have been widely used as instruments for labor supply in the empirical labor
market literature, see for instance Mulligan and Rubinstein (2008). We, however, note that the validity
of this approach is not undisputed, as the number of children might be correlated with unobservables
also aﬀecting the wage outcome, like relative preference for family and working life. For this reason,
Huber and Mellace (2014) provided a method to partially test instrument validity, namely a joint test
for the exclusion restriction and additive separability of the unobservable V in the selection equation.
They applied them to children-based instruments for female labor supply in four data sets, but found no
statistical evidence for the violation of the IV assumptions. As a word of caution, however, their tests
cannot detect all possible violations of instrument validity even asymptotically, as they rely on a partial
identiﬁcation approach. Even though concerns about the instruments may therefore remain, it is our
aim to verify how sensitive decompositions are across diﬀerent methods, also w.r.t. modelling selection
based on instruments commonly used in the literature. In a robustness check, we consider an indicator
for the respondent's mother working for pay back when the respondent was 14 years old as an additional
instrument for selection. This, however, yields very similar point estimates based on (10) and (11) as when
using the children-based instruments alone, see the discussion below.
4 Empirical results
We decompose the gender wage gap based on the ﬁve approaches outlined in Section 2. Table 1 provides
the estimated eﬀects (est.) along with standards errors (s.e.) and p-values (p-val) using 999 bootstrap
replications. It also shows the shares (% tot.) of the explained and unexplained components in the total
gender wage gap. The last two columns (Trimmed obs., %) indicate, respectively, the number and the share
of units dropped in the IPW estimations due to a trimming rule that discards observations with extreme
propensity scores larger than 0.99 and/or smaller than 0.01. This is done to prevent the assignment of very
large weights to speciﬁc observations (due to small denominators in IPW) as a consequence of insuﬃcient
common support across gender or selection into employment.
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Our main speciﬁcation includes the full list of post-group characteristics (X) presented in Table 3
in Appendix A, as well as several higher-order and interaction terms.9 The standard Oaxaca-Blinder
decomposition (Oaxaca-Bl.) based on (2) and (3) as well as IPW (IPW no W ) based on (4) and (5) invoke
Assumption 1 and thus neither control for the potential endogeneity of X nor for selection. Therefore,
estimations are conducted in the subsample with S = 1. Under Assumption 2, IPW is based on (6) and (7)
and includes potential confoundersW listed in Table 3 in Appendix A (IPW withW ) to tackle endogeneity.
Under Assumption 3, IPW based on (8) and (9) uses these covariates to control for both endogeneity and
selection (IPW MAR). Finally, under Assumption 4, IPW based on (10) and (11) in addition utilizes a
combination of the number of children younger than 6 and 15 years old as instruments (Z) for selection
into employment (IPW IV).
Table 1: Gender wage gap decomposition based on NLSY79: main speciﬁcation
Total gap in log wages Explained (Indirect) Unexplained (Direct) Trimmed
est. s.e. p-val est. s.e. p-val % tot. est. s.e. p-val % tot. obs. %
Oaxaca-Bl. 0.299 0.019 0.000 0.083 0.021 0.000 27.9% 0.215 0.024 0.000 72.1% 0 0.0%
IPW no W 0.293 0.019 0.000 0.118 0.030 0.000 40.1% 0.176 0.031 0.000 59.9% 28 0.5%
IPW with W 0.264 0.017 0.000 0.096 0.028 0.001 36.5% 0.168 0.030 0.000 63.5% 28 0.5%
IPW MAR 0.365 0.035 0.000 0.219 0.033 0.000 59.8% 0.147 0.035 0.000 40.2% 90 1.4%
IPW IV 0.141 0.324 0.665 -0.005 0.102 0.964 -3.3% 0.145 0.328 0.658 103.3% 584 8.8%
Notes: Standard errors and p-values are estimated based on 999 bootstrap replications. The trimming rule discards
observations with propensity scores (speciﬁc to each estimator) below 0.01 or above 0.99.
When applying the classic Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition, 28% (0.083) of the total gender wage gap10
of 0.299 is attributed to diﬀerences in the included post-group characteristics X, while about 72% (0.215)
remains unexplained. All estimates are highly statistically signiﬁcant.11 In contrast to the Oaxaca-Blinder
decomposition, IPW without W does not impose linearity of Y in X given G but instead requires an
estimate of the propensity score Pr(G = 1|X), which is obtained by logit regression. Figures 5 to 13 and
Tables 4 and 5 in Appendix A present, respectively, histograms and summary statistics (minimum, mean,
9The included higher-order terms are marriage history squared and cubed, tenure squared and cubed, and
years in current occupation squared and cubed. The interaction terms are between binary indicators for region
in 1998 and urban residency, ﬁrst job before 1975, ﬁrst job in 1976-79, industry indicators, and employment in
1998; between education indicators and occupation indicators, years in current occupation, and the employment
indicator 1998; and between tenure and the urban indicator, occupation indicators, years in current occupation,
and the full-time employment indicator in 1998.
10Among the methods considered, the diﬀerences in the estimates of the total wage gap are statistically signiﬁcant
at the 10% level between the Oaxaca-Blinder and the IPW MAR estimators, Oaxaca-Blinder and IPW IV, IPW
without and with controlling for W , IPW without W and IPW IV, and IPW MAR and IPW IV.
11The regression-based Oaxaca-Blinder estimator does not rely on common support, see the discussion in Section
2, and therefore does not require trimming observations with extreme propensity score values.
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and maximum) of the within-group propensity scores used in our IPW-based estimations.12 Figure 5
suggests a decent overlap in the distribution of estimates of Pr(G = 1|X), implying common support in
observed characteristics across females and males over most of the support of X. Applying a trimming
rule that excludes observations with propensity scores below 0.01, we drop 28 units, or 0.5%, from the
sample. Compared to the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition, the explained component is slightly larger and
the unexplained component is somewhat smaller, while total wage gap remains almost unchanged. For
IPW including potential confoundersW , Figures 6 and 7 in Appendix A display the histograms of the logit-
based estimates of Pr(G = 1|W ) and Pr(G = 1|X,W ) and point to decent common support w.r.t. either
propensity score. Therefore, (only) the same 28 observations as for IPW are without controls dropped
from the sample. Controlling for W leads to moderately smaller estimates of the total wage gap as well as
the explained and unexplained components when compared to IPW without controls.
IPW MAR relies on estimating the selection propensity score Pr(S = 1|G,X,W ) to control for the
employment decision based on observables, again by logit regression. Figure 10 in Appendix A presents
histograms of estimated selection probabilities for individuals who worked less than 1,000 hours in the past
calendar year (S = 0) and those who worked 1,000 hours or more (S = 1). We note that the selection
probability is close to zero for a subset of individuals but clearly larger than zero for most of the sample. 90
(1.4%) observations are dropped from estimation, once the additional condition that selection propensity
scores must not be smaller than 0.01 is added to the previous trimming rule. The total wage gap (0.365 log
points) and the explained component (0.219 log points) are considerably larger than under IPW controlling
forW (but ignoring selection). In contrast, the magnitude of the unexplained component (0.147 log points)
is slightly smaller, resulting in an overall drop of its share in the total wage gap to 40%. Any estimates
discussed so far are statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
In addition to controlling for observables, our last estimator, IPW IV, uses the number of children under
15 and under 6 years as instruments to control for selection. It requires the estimation of p(Q) = Pr(S =
1|Q) (with Q = (G,X,W,Z)), Pr(G = 1|W,p(Q)), and Pr(G = 1|X,W, p(Q)). Figures 11, 12, and 13
provide the logit estimates of the respective propensity scores. Common support is by and large satisfactory.
The trimming rule discards observations with estimates of Pr(G = 1|X = x,W = w, p(Q) = p(q)) < 0.01,
of Pr(G = 1|W = w, p(Q) = p(q)) > 0.99, and of p(q) < 0.01, all in all 584 cases (8.8%). This needs to
be kept in mind when interpreting the results, as trimming generally changes the target population for
12Table 7 in Appendix A additionally provides the number and the share of trimmed observations for each
propensity score.
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which the parameters are estimated. The total wage gap drops substantially when compared to previous
estimates and amounts to 0.141 log points. The unexplained component is similar in magnitude to the
IPW MAR estimate, while the explained part is very close to zero but even negative. However, the
IPW IV estimates are far from being statistically signiﬁcant at any conventional level, pointing to a weak
instrument problem.
We conduct several sensitivity checks by gradually reducing the set of post-group characteristics X.
Table 8 in Appendix A presents the estimates obtained when dropping any higher-order and interaction
terms of X, such that the functional forms in the outcome and propensity score speciﬁcations become less
ﬂexible. While the total wage gap estimates remain largely unchanged, the explained components generally
decline slightly (by about 0.03 log points), and the unexplained components increase, on average, by the
same amount. The exception is the IPW IV decomposition, where both the total gap and its explained
component somewhat increase, whereas the size and the share of the unexplained component decline.
However, all the IPW IV estimates remain statistically insigniﬁcant. All in all, these diﬀerences are minor,
which suggests that our results are rather robust to the exclusion of higher-order and interaction terms of
X.
Our next robustness check excludes not only the higher-order and interaction terms, but also all varia-
bles in X that reﬂect developments or histories like years in marriage, years worked in current occupation,
etc. We point out that many of these variables are frequently not included in wage decompositions, even
though they appear a priori similarly important as characteristics measured at a particular point in time.
For instance, one would suspect that not only the current occupation matters for human capital accumu-
lation and the determination of the current wage, but also employment history and tenure in the current
occupation. The exclusion of these additional variables generally decreases the explained component and
increases the unexplained component, which accounts for 77% to 96% of the total gap across the ﬁrst four
methods. IPW IV yields diﬀerent and even more extreme estimates, which are, however, at best margi-
nally signiﬁcant. Table 2 provides the results.
The Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition yields quite stable estimates when compared to the main speciﬁca-
tion of Table 1. The total gap estimate does not change, while the explained component decreases and the
unexplained component increases each by about 0.02 log points, or about 5 percentage points of the total
gap. For the IPW estimators not accounting for selection, the explained components decline by about 0.1
log point, now constituting only a small share of the total gap and losing their statistical signiﬁcance. Over
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Table 2: Robustness check: parsimonious set of X
Total gap in log wages Explained (Indirect) Unexplained (Direct) Trimmed
est. s.e. p-val est. s.e. p-val % tot. est. s.e. p-val % tot. obs. %
Oaxaca-Bl. 0.299 0.019 0.000 0.067 0.019 0.000 22.5% 0.231 0.022 0.000 77.5% 0 0.0%
IPW no W 0.298 0.019 0.000 0.026 0.023 0.269 8.6% 0.272 0.026 0.000 91.4% 1 0.0%
IPW with W 0.269 0.017 0.000 0.011 0.023 0.648 3.9% 0.258 0.027 0.000 96.1% 2 0.0%
IPW MAR 0.362 0.032 0.000 0.076 0.025 0.002 20.9% 0.287 0.032 0.000 79.1% 1 0.0%
IPW IV 0.124 0.324 0.703 -0.186 0.102 0.067 -150.6% 0.310 0.328 0.345 250.6% 850 12.8%
Notes: Standard errors and p-values are estimated based on 999 bootstrap replications. The trimming rule discards
observations with propensity scores (speciﬁc to each estimator) below 0.01 or above 0.99.
90% of the total wage gap remains unexplained both for IPW with and without controlling forW . Also for
the IPW estimators accounting for selection, the explained components decrease considerably, while the
explained components increase and the total gap is slightly smaller than before. In the case of IPW MAR,
the unexplained part now accounts for nearly 80% of the total wage gap. All the IPW MAR estimates
are statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level. The IPW IV estimator yields rather implausible results. The
large unexplained component of 0.31 log points comprises 251% of the total wage gap, due to a negative
estimate of the explained component. However, none of these estimates are statistically signiﬁcant at the
5%.
As a ﬁnal robustness check for IPW IV, we add an indicator for whether an individual's mother worked
for pay when the individual was 14 years old as an additional instrument for selection into paid work.
Table 9 in Appendix A shows that the estimates remain unchanged compared to the main speciﬁcation.
Overall, our empirical results suggest that estimates of the gender wage decomposition are dependent on
the choice of underlying identiﬁcation assumptions and, to some extent, the deﬁnition of the observed
characteristics X. Given the variability of estimates across methods and speciﬁcations, we advise to be
cautious w.r.t. the use of wage decompositions for policy conclusions, for instance about the magnitude of
gender discrimination in the labor market.
5 Conclusion
We assessed the sensitivity of average gender wage gap decompositions in data from the U.S. National
Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979, comparing several decomposition methods and sets of included varia-
bles. We ﬁrst discussed the identiﬁcation problem from a causal perspective, namely separating the explai-
ned component of the wage eﬀect of gender operating through observed characteristics from the unexplai-
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ned component. Five decomposition techniques were reviewed. Starting with the linear Oaxaca-Blinder
decomposition, we gradually relaxed the identifying assumptions regarding functional form, exogeneity of
observed characteristics and gender, and selection into employment. Speciﬁcally, we considered inverse
probability weighting (IPW) as a semiparametric analog of the standard Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition.
We also included IPW versions controlling for confounders (of observed characteristics, gender, and the
wage outcome) or for both confounders and sample selection into employment, the latter either based on
observed variables or instruments. When applying all ﬁve estimators to the data, we also considered less
and more parsimonious deﬁnitions of the observed characteristics and instruments included in the analysis.
We found the total wage gap as well as the explained and unexplained components to diﬀer importantly
across some of the methods considered. Furthermore, the deﬁnition of the observed characteristics related
to the explained component mattered: Including only levels of variables rather than both levels and
histories generally reduced the explained and increased the unexplained components across the considered
estimators. Given our results, the usefulness of wage decompositions that neither account for identiﬁcation
issues like endogeneity and selection into employment nor for histories of observed characteristics appears
questionable in terms of policy conclusions, for instance, when aiming at quantifying gender discrimination.
Unfortunately, a vast number of empirical applications rely on exactly such kind of decompositions. At
the very least, we advise checking the robustness of the results across several decomposition methods and
variable speciﬁcations to improve upon the status quo of the literature.
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A Appendix
Table 3: Summary statistics and mean diﬀerences by gender
Variables Male(G = 1) Female(G = 0) Diﬀerence p-value
Outcome Y (non-logged, refers to selected population with S = 1)
Hourly wage 19.370 14.164 5.206 0.000
Mediators X (refer to 1998 unless otherwise is stated)
Married 0.566 0.568 -0.002 0.882
Years married total since 1979 6.430 7.537 -1.107 0.000
Northeastern region 0.153 0.155 -0.002 0.857
North Central region 0.242 0.237 0.005 0.602
West region 0.206 0.195 0.011 0.244
South region (ref.) 0.399 0.414 -0.015 0.205
Years lived in current region since 1979 14.839 15.246 -0.407 0.000
Resides in SMSA 0.811 0.816 -0.005 0.584
Years lived in SMSA since 1979 13.488 14.201 -0.713 0.000
Less than high school (ref.) 0.129 0.101 0.028 0.000
High school graduate 0.459 0.416 0.043 0.000
Some college 0.208 0.271 -0.063 0.000
College or more 0.204 0.213 -0.009 0.413
First job before 1975 0.065 0.046 0.019 0.001
First job in 197679 0.115 0.128 -0.013 0.083
First job after 1979 (ref.) 0.821 0.825 -0.004 0.623
Numer of jobs ever had 10.555 9.239 1.316 0.000
Tenure with current employer (wks.) 276.056 212.662 63.394 0.000
Industry: Primary sector 0.227 0.078 0.149 0.000
Industry: Manufacturing (ref.) 0.140 0.053 0.087 0.000
Industry: Transport 0.115 0.048 0.067 0.000
Industry: Trade 0.134 0.142 -0.008 0.322
Industry: Finance 0.040 0.064 -0.024 0.000
Industry: Services (business, personnel, and entertain.) 0.121 0.124 -0.003 0.768
Industry: Professional services 0.113 0.297 -0.184 0.000
Industry: Public administration 0.054 0.052 0.002 0.751
Years worked in current industry since 1982 3.555 2.622 0.933 0.000
Manager 0.234 0.258 -0.024 0.022
Technical occupation (ref.) 0.039 0.038 0.001 0.907
Occupation in sales 0.067 0.082 -0.015 0.021
Clerical occupation 0.056 0.212 -0.156 0.000
Occupation in service 0.102 0.163 -0.061 0.000
Farmer or laborer 0.276 0.042 0.234 0.000
Operator (machines, transport) 0.170 0.063 0.107 0.000
Years worked in current occupation since 1982 2.180 1.727 0.453 0.000
Employment status: employed 0.877 0.748 0.129 0.000
Number of years employed status since 1979 13.204 11.271 1.933 0.000
Employed full time 0.846 0.599 0.247 0.000
Share of full-time employment 1994-98 0.896 0.658 0.238 0.000
Continued on next page
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Table 3  continued from previous page
Variables Male(G = 1) Female(G = 0) Diﬀerence p-value
Total number of weeks worked since 1979 661.794 560.408 101.386 0.000
Total number of weeks unemployed since 1979 62.343 49.744 12.599 0.000
Total number of weeks out of labor force since 1979 146.118 265.276 -119.158 0.000
Bad health prevents from working 0.045 0.055 -0.010 0.071
Years not working due to bad health since 1979 0.326 0.557 -0.231 0.000
Pre-treatment covariates W
Hispanic (ref.) 0.193 0.186 0.007 0.488
Black 0.287 0.297 -0.010 0.413
White 0.520 0.517 0.003 0.840
Born in the U.S. 0.935 0.939 -0.004 0.544
No religion 0.045 0.034 0.011 0.031
Protestant 0.501 0.500 0.001 0.957
Catholic (ref.) 0.352 0.352 0.000 0.967
Other religion 0.096 0.112 -0.016 0.036
Mother born in U.S. 0.884 0.896 -0.012 0.102
Motherâs educ. <high school (ref.) 0.376 0.421 -0.045 0.000
Motherâs educ. high school graduate 0.393 0.369 0.024 0.048
Motherâs educ. some college 0.094 0.091 0.003 0.616
Motherâs educ. college/more 0.076 0.071 0.005 0.411
Father born in U.S. 0.878 0.884 -0.006 0.410
Fatherâs educ. <high school (ref.) 0.351 0.366 -0.015 0.201
Fatherâs educ. high school graduate 0.291 0.297 -0.006 0.560
Fatherâs educ. some college 0.087 0.076 0.011 0.105
Fatherâs educ. college/more 0.131 0.117 0.014 0.085
Order of birth 3.195 3.259 -0.064 0.256
Age in 1979 17.501 17.611 -0.110 0.047
Selection indicator S
Worked 1,000 hrs or more past year 0.867 0.696 0.171 0.000
Instrumental variables Z
Number of children under 15 1.286 1.209 0.077 0.008
Number of children under 6 0.353 0.295 0.058 0.000
Mother worked at 14 0.543 0.539 0.004 0.718
N of obs. 3,162 3,496 . .
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Figure 5: Distribution of the estimated Pr(G = 1|X) by treatment states in seleted population
Figure 6: Distribution of the estimated Pr(G = 1|W ) by treatment states in seleted population
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Figure 7: Distribution of the estimated Pr(G = 1|X,W ) by treatment states in seleted population
Figure 8: Distribution of the estimated Pr(G = 1|W ) by treatment states in total population
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Figure 9: Distribution of the estimated Pr(G = 1|X,W ) by treatment states in total population
Figure 10: Distribution of the estimated Pr(S = 1|G,X,W ) by selection states
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Figure 11: Distribution of the estimated p(Q) = Pr(S = 1|G,X,W,Z) by selection states
Figure 12: Distribution of the estimated Pr(G = 1|W,p(Q)) by treatment states in total popula-
tion
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Figure 13: Distribution of the estimated Pr(G = 1|X,W, p(Q)) by treatment states in total
population
Table 4: Summary of the estimated treatment propensity scores in selected population
Min Mean Max Min Mean Max
Female (G=0) Male (G=1)
Pr(G = 1|X) 0.00166 0.34454 0.9819 0.01835 0.6943 0.99047
Pr(G = 1|W ) 0.30751 0.52389 0.8023 0.39349 0.53517 0.87171
Pr(G = 1|X,W ) 0.00133 0.34042 0.9816 0.01574 0.69795 0.99287
Table 5: Summary of the estimated treatment propensity scores in total population
Min Mean Max Min Mean Max
Female (G=0) Male (G=1)
Pr(G = 1|W ) 0.36159 0.47140 0.76295 0.37095 0.47881 0.80260
Pr(G = 1|X,W ) 0.00081 0.29707 0.97202 0.01322 0.67155 0.99619
Pr(G = 1|W,p(Q)) 0.10313 0.43167 0.80670 0.09923 0.52273 0.89403
Pr(G = 1|X,W, p(Q)) 3.22× 10−7 0.23804 0.99983 0.00065 0.73682 0.99999
Table 6: Summary of the estimated selection propensity scores in total population
Min Mean Max Min Mean Max
Did not work (S=0) Worked (S=1)
Pr(S = 1|G,X,W ) 0.00327 0.36952 0.99272 0.02076 0.89392 0.99911
Pr(S = 1|G,X,W,Z) 0.00315 0.36669 0.99386 0.02150 0.89473 0.99909
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Table 7: Number of trimmed observations for each propensity score
Trimming condition obs. % tot.
Treatment propensity scores in selected population
Pr(G = 1|X)<0.01 28 0.5
Pr(G = 1|W )<0.01 0 0.0
Pr(G = 1|W )>0.99 0 0.0
Pr(G = 1|X,W )<0.01 28 0.5
Treatment and selection propensity scores in total population
Pr(G = 1|W )<0.01 0 0.0
Pr(G = 1|W )>0.99 0 0.0
Pr(G = 1|X,W )<0.01 61 0.9
Pr(S = 1|G,X,W )<0.01 29 0.4
Pr(S = 1|G,X,W,Z)<0.01 30 0.4
Pr(G = 1|W,p(Q))<0.01 0 0.0
Pr(G = 1|W,p(Q))>0.99 0 0.0
Pr(G = 1|X,W, p(Q))<0.01 554 8.3
Table 8: Robustness check: no interactions in X
Total gap in log wages Explained (Indirect) Unexplained (Direct) Trimmed
est. s.e. p-val est. s.e. p-val % tot. est. s.e. p-val % tot. obs. %
Oaxaca-Bl. 0.299 0.019 0.000 0.084 0.020 0.000 28.1% 0.215 0.023 0.000 71.9% 0 0.0%
IPW no W 0.295 0.019 0.000 0.093 0.029 0.001 31.7% 0.201 0.030 0.000 68.3% 21 0.4%
IPW with W 0.265 0.017 0.000 0.074 0.028 0.009 27.7% 0.192 0.030 0.000 72.3% 22 0.4%
IPW MAR 0.375 0.034 0.000 0.175 0.033 0.000 46.5% 0.201 0.033 0.000 53.5% 44 0.7%
IPW IV 0.148 0.324 0.649 0.031 0.102 0.758 21.2% 0.116 0.328 0.723 78.8% 673 10.1%
Notes: Standard errors and p-values are estimated based on 999 bootstrap replications. The trimming rule discards
observations with propensity scores (speciﬁc to each estimator) below 0.01 or above 0.99.
Table 9: Mother worked at 14 as an additional IV, full set of X
Total gap in log wages Explained (Indirect) Unexplained (Direct) Trimmed
est. s.e. p-val est. s.e. p-val % tot. est. s.e. p-val % tot. obs. %
IPW IV 0.140 0.156 0.369 -0.005 0.080 0.948 -4% 0.145 0.175 0.408 104% 583 9%
Notes: Standard errors and p-values are estimated based on 999 bootstrap replications. The trimming rule discards
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Abstract
This paper investigates the sensitivity of average wage gap decompositions to methods resting on different 
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functional form. Applying five distinct decomposition techniques to estimate the gender wage gap in the U.S. using 
data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979, we find that the magnitudes of the wage gap components 
are generally not stable across methods. Furthermore, the definition of the observed characteristics matters: merely 
including their levels (as frequently seen in wage decompositions) entails smaller explained and larger unexplained 
components than when including both their levels and histories in the analysis. Given the sensitivity of our results, we 
advise caution when using wage decompositions for policy recommendations.
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